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In the 50s, China's Trust and Investment Companies (TICs) first emerged as 
providers of credit and trust services that was not offered by the premature banking 
system at that time. Granted by its special economic status, these TICs enjoyed more 
flexibility in lending terms, and had access to funds from a variety of sources. 
Following a series of financial reforms in 90s, regulatory concerns grew about the 
wide range of activities conducted by TICs and their complex relationships with state 
banks in China. While the government has made tremendous moves towards 
removing their affiliation to banks, the question remains is, "how should be the role of 
TICs to be defined in regard of China's present financial system?" 
Through the investigation of GITIC's collapse, this study traces the 
development of China's financial reforms and their primary effects on the evolution of 
TICs. It analyzes the regulatory and financial framework within which TICs operate, 
evaluates the difficulties that China's TICs face today, and assesses possible actions 
that might be taken for a better China's financial system. 
As shown in this study, the Asian Crisis is only an immediate cause of the 
GITIC incident rather than the real killer of the company. It has been found that 
problems behind the TICs are various. Its entangled relationship with the banks and 
government authorities reduces its management efficiency and flexibility. These 
issues inevitably led to more serious financial problems, including (i) poor risk 
management system, (ii) lack of supervision by PBOC, (iii) large amount of unhedged 
foreign exchange exposure, (iv) investments of questionable quality, (v) unstable 
iii 
funding, and (vi) mismatches in asset liquidity terms. 
Someone think that the incident is good as it can bring those foreign investors 
to the fact that they are actually too optimistic and aggressive to China's market. This 
can also give the Chinese government an opportunity to clean up all ill-operated 
entities. However, people are afraid that foreign investors will leave the Chinese 
market forever after this scandal. There are also some implications behind this 
incident that are worth to consider, like (i) the poor compliance concept in Chinese 
culture, (ii) the unhealthy ownership structure in China's business system, (iii) the 
quality of human capital, and (iv) TICs as a transitional product in the economic 
history of China. 
Besides the immediate concerns of foreign investors' confidence and China's 
creditability in the international markets, the way how the Chinese government handle 
this issue will definitely set an example and pass an important message to the 
observers. The consequences will also affect the role of TICs in China's financial 
system in the long run. Other immediate actions required are (i) the change of 
supervisory system, (ii) continuous effort in correcting problematic TICs. (iii) revising 
ofaccounting and compliance standards, and (iv) restructuring of legal framework for 
TICs. All in all，we think that the most important issues are about education and a 
clean up of China's business system from inside out. The complexity of China's 
business system definitely increases difficulties in making these corrections, but it's 
an issue which could not be avoided by the Chinese government in viewing the 
invulnerable need of reform. 
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Since China started its economic reform in 1978, profound changes have taken 
place in almost every aspect of its financial system, which have produced mixed 
results. One of the results is the re-emergence and growth of non-bank financial 
institutions O^BFIs). Among the non-financial institutions, China's TICs (Trust and 
Investment Companies) epitomize the most the conflicts that arise due to the growth 
I 
of new, innovative financial institutions, within the framework of a large traditional 
financial sector undergoing a series of reforms. These institutions have been able to 
circumvent the constraints under which the traditional financial system operates: they 
chose borrowers and projects outside the state's Credit Plan, they enjoyed greater 
discretion on the rates and terms they offer for lending and have provided a range of 
“ services not offered by banks. 
Objective 
This study investigates the changing role of TICs and its implications to 
China's financial reforms through the examination of banking reforms and the recent 
collapse o f G I T l C . In section II，we analyze the historical financial reforms (mostly 
i 
banking reforms) adopted in China and assess their preliminary effects on the 
development o f T I C s in China. In section III，the growth and changing role of TICs 
will be examined. Finally, f rom section IV to VI, the collapse of GITIC will be 
investigated, by which we will point out the difficulties the China's financial system 
2 
face today, identify concerns on regulatory and supervisory framework, and discuss 
actions which could help its future development. It is obvious that one major impact 
of the GITIC incident is the collapse of investors' confidence. In fact, many banks 
that lent to GITIC without registering their loans with the central authorities may get 
zero payback. Although foreign investors had been assured by central-bank officials 
last October, when GITIC was suddenly shut down, that registered lenders would be 
at the front of the creditors' queue and would get their money back. But it has tumed 
out that all the loan registrations, state and provincial guarantees, and “comfort 
letters" for foreign loans count for little. 
Methodology 
This study is based largely on a qualitative approach. The task of preparation 
included visits to investment bankers and banking professionals. Information was 
also collected through literal review and extensive research on Chinese financial 
system, especially the financial reforms in 90s and extensive research. Upon 
collecting information, qualitative analysis was performed with focus on the TICs. 




HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL REFORMS (1979-1992) 
Financial refomi has been one of China's most important areas of reform since 
1978. Over the past 16 years, China has converted the People's Bank of China into a 
central bank; established a commercial banking system that consists of four major 
specialized banks, three policy banks, and many commercial and local banks; and 
created a large number of non-bank financial institutions. 
> 
Although China's financial reform is far from complete, it has important 
effects on China's financial system and its link to TICs, development. This chapter 
will review the progress of China's financial reforms (mostly banking reforms) over 
the past 16 years, with an emphasis on their developments in 1990s, and asses the 
preliminary effects of their implementation on China's financial system and TICs" re-
emergence. 
Banking Reforms from 1979 to 1992 
Most observers of the Chinese economy agree that the country's banking 
sector experienced no significant reforms in the 1980s and. as a result, lacked the 
institutional capacity to serve China's fast-growing and increasingly market-oriented 
4 
economy. ‘ There is a general consensus among Chinese and Western economists that, 
despite several institutional and policy changes that had important effects on China's 
‘ For assessments by Chinese economists, see Ceil R. Dipchand et al., The Chinese 
Financial System (Wwestport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); World Bank. China: Macroeconomic 
Stability in a Decentralized Economy (Washington. DC, 1995). 
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banking sector between 1979 and 1992, the Chinese banking system had remained 
basically unreformed and institutionally incapable of performing the role of financial 
intermediation in an increasingly market-oriented economy. 
Despite the lack of dramatic breakthroughs in reforming the banking sector 
during 1979-1992, a lot of incremental and relatively minor changes were introduced. 
Most evident is the increased level of diversity in the banking sector. The monobank 
system that monopolized the Chinese financial system before 1979 was completely 
transformed. The PBOC was divested of its commercial banking functions after the 
establishment of four specialized state banks: the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), 
the Bank of China (BOC), the People's Construction Bank (PCB), and the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank (ICB). The divestiture of its commercial banking enabled the 
PBOC formally to become the central bank in 1984. 
Table 1.1 (Appendix I) suggests that there vvere three periods of restructuring 
in the Chinese banking sector. The first period, from 1979 to 1984. saw the 
establishment of the PBOC as the central bank and the four specialized state banks as 
the dominant players in the banking system. During the second period—the late 
1980s-several smaller banks were set up as an experiment to increase the level of 
diversify in the banking sector. The direct owners of man>' new banks were either 
joint-stock holders or state-owned conglomerates. Moreo%'er. foreign banks were 
allowed to set up branches in China, mainly to serve the growing number of foreign 
joint ventures and wholly owned firms in China. The third period—the early 1990s— 
j 
was marked by an expansion of the experiments conducted in the late 1980s. More 
jC5int-stock banks (mainly regional commercial banks and urban cooperative banks) 
were formed. • 
Throughout the 1980s, a large number of non-bank financial institutions 
5 
emerged. They included tens of thousands of rural and urban credit cooperatives, 
hundreds of trust and investments companies, finance firms, leasing firms, insurance 
companies, and securities firms. By 1993, China's banking system mainly consisted 
of the following specialized banks and non-bank institutions: (1) the Agriculture 
Bank; (2) the Bank of China; (3) the Construction Bank; (4) the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank; (5) Rural Credit Cooperatives; (6) Urban Credit Cooperatives; (7) 
the Bank of Communications; (8) the China International Investment Corporation 
(CITIC); (9) Guangdong Finance Corporation; and (10) the People's Insurance 
Company 
Reforms since 1994 
I 
The structural changes taken from 1979-1992 on the financial system have 
greatly increased the competitive pressure on the dominant specialized state banks 
and created financial intermediaries to serve the fast-growing non-state sector. 
Although the pace of these structural changes was slow, the effects of these changes 
were substantial. First, the market share of deposits for the seven largest state banks 
had been declining since the mid-1980s. - Second, the loan market had also been 
made more competitive. The steady decline of the dominance of state banks was 
indicated by the fact that the share of loans held by the seven largest state banks fell to 
about 78% by 1996. 
However, despite the reforms from 1972-92, the Chinese banking system still 
suffered from three major weaknesses. First, The lack of autonomy o f t h e PBOC was 
r 
“ The market share of deposits for the seven largest state banks has been declining since the 
mid-1980s. In 1986, these state banks controlled about 83% of the total bank deposits; a decade later, 
their share fell to 72%. At the same time, the market share of deposits for regional banks, urban credit 
cooperatives, and trust and investment companies all rose substantially {Sowce: Almanac ofChina's 
Finance and Banking, various years; data for 1996 were obtained from Shonggiio jinron^ 3, (1997) 
pp.29-3/.) “ � ’ ’ 
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a well-known fact. Chinese banks have been politically too weak to resist the 
demands placed by the central government on their activities. Second, the Chinese 
banks were financially weak. The accumulation of government-directed loans and 
lending to non-viable projects eventually led to the rise of non-performing loans in the 
portfolios ofbanks . In fact, the weak regulatory regime of the banking system and the 
financial weakness of Chinese banks explained in part of the overheating of economy 
in 1993.3 
Due to the weakness of Chinese banking system and the outburst of 1993 
crisis, many important reforms were launched, which included: 
• Increasing Central Bank Autonomy, the autonomy of the central bank had 
been increased (especially from local political interests); the central bank, was 
also re-organized to centralize power at the national head office. This put an 
end to its role in managing regional economic activities or industrial 
restructuring. 
• Launching Aeii' Tools ofMonetary ManagemenC. the open market operations 
and expanding bill discounting and re-discounting were started. 
• Reforming The Four Specialized Sfa(e-Banks: the four banks were turned into 
commercial banks, preferably broken up into regional banks: they were forced 
to adopt international standards offinancial accounting operational practices 
• Increasing Competition: urban cooperative and rural cooperative banks were 
also formed on the basis of credit cooperatives; developing regional banks 
>r 
3 The origins of the banking crisis in 1993 should be traced to the second ha l fo f l992 after 
the late Deng Xiaoping's tour of Southern China ignited a new round of economic expansion 
throughout the country. Government figures show a rapid monetary expansion in 1992, with MO at 
RMB$ 115.8 billion, representing a217% increase over 1991 and the largest amount in the history of 
the PRC. Besides, a wave of speculation led to a massive outflow of funds from the banking system 
into the real estate markets (mainly in the coastal areas ) Also See The Almanac ofChina's Finance and 
Banking 1994. 
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• Establishing Policy Banks 
• Unifying The Nation s Financial Markets 
• Reform The Foreign Exchange System: rates were unified, and Renminbi was 
designated for current account transactions. 
• Interest Rate Reforms: banks were allowed to set loans rates within a certain 
range. 
Effects of Reforms 
These reforms taken since 1994 have produced mixed results, which led to 
significant impacts for the years to come. Its main impacts include (1) the autonomy 
of the Central Bank, (2) new instruments of monetary management, (3) the interbank 
( 
market, and (4) competition and regulation in the banking sector. 
Central Bank Autonomy 
Most evident is the increase in autonomy of the central bank - PBOC. The 
independence of the central bank from sub-national interests is more ensured. To 
provide a sound legal basis of an autonomous central bank, the National People's 
Congress (NPC) passed the People's bank Law in March 1995 (See Table 1.2 and 1.3 
in Appendix). Several key provisions of the law enhanced the legal status of the 
central bank. First, the law clearly defined the tvvo most important missions of the 
central bank: maintaining currency stability and supervising financial institutions. 
Second, the law formally bans the central bank from financing the overdraft of the 
I 
treasury and from directly purchasing and selling treasury debt or other government 
debt. The new rule also ensures further the independence of the central bank from 
sub-national interests. For example, under Article 29, the central bank is not allowed 
to make loans to local governments or government departments, to non-bank financial 
8 
institutions, other units or individuals. 
New Instruments ofMonetary Management 
In view of the ineffectiveness of the past credit quota system, indirect 
instruments of monetary management were developed to enhance the capability of the 
central bank. In 1994-96, as a result of the reforms，the PBOC implemented open 
market operations, expansion of discounting and re-discounting, and replacement of 
credit quota with asset-liability ratio to determine the amount of lending by the 
individual banks / 
Reforms of the Interbank Market 
The interbank market itself was first regulated under the ‘‘Provisional 
Regulations of Interbank Transactions of 1990," and was enacted on March 8，1990. 
However, compliance with these regulations was poor. Non Bank Financial 
Institutions (or the NBFIs)- actively participated in the system and borrowed heavily 
from it. Many of these funds have been used to invest in risky ventures. This 
prompted the PBC to take measures in attempt to curb these abuses. Thus, additional 
regulations were issued, including (i) a Notice on Strengthening Administration of 
Interbank Transactions (ii) a Notice on Rationalizing Interbank Transactions, and (iii) 
Several Regulations on Correcting Illegal Interbank Transactions. Their objective is 
to redefine interbank transactions and prohibit funds among different vertical levels 
i 
4 After extensive preparations, the PBOC began open market operations on a small scale in 
April 1996. Initially, only the PBOC and the 14 commercial banks were allowed to participate in these 
transactions. The government planned gradually to include other financial institutions. Treasury bills 
with maturity of one year and less were traded on the open market. However, the shortage of short-
term treasury bills limited the size of open market operations. The weekly purchase of T-bills by the 
central bank amounted to RMB$ 40-50 million each week (by comparison, state banks traded billions 
ofyuan in T-bonds on the secondary market). The tumover of open market operations between April 
and October in 1996 was only RMB$ 3 billion and had no impact on the financial markets. 
NBFIs include urban credit cooperatives, rural credit cooperatives, finance companies, 
leasing companies and trust and investment corporations (TICs). 
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within either specialized banks or commercial banks. These regulations also prohibit 
transactions between various banks and their international business departments. 
Regulation and Competition 
A source ofconfl ic t of interests and illegal activities in the banking sector was 
the close ties between banks and the various non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) 
they operated, such as securities firms and trust companies. As discussed earlier, 
banks diverted credit to these entities to engage in high-risk and unregulated 
investment activities (stock market manipulation and real estate investment). One of 
the top priorities of Chinese reformers following the implementation of the financial 
reform package in 1994 was to impose a tight regulatory regime on banks. Although 
I 
the reforms were far from complete, the basic elements of this regime began to 
emerge. 
1. Separation of commercial banking from investment banking. The 1992-1993 
financial chaos due to many banks" engagement in investment in the securities 
market led to the regulation requiring all banks to divest themselves of 
investment banking affiliates. The Commercial Bank Law stipulates that 
commercial banks are not allowed to engage in securities trading and 
underwriting investment in non-bank financial enterprises and productive 
enterprises and trust investment. In early June 1997. alarmed by the 
speculative bubbles in the stock markets mainly caused by the huge illegal 
inflow of funds from banks, the PBOC took even more drastic action. Under 
the new rule each TIC is supposed to participate in interbank lending only in 
«r 
the financial center where its head office was located and/or registered. 
2. Imposing new management guidelines and practices. The reforms re-
centralized the authority o f t h e head offices of the four specialized state banks 
10 
and made them responsible for their own liquidity and credit control. In an 
attempt to replace the credit plan eventually, the government began to 
experiment with asset-liability management and with the amount of lending 
determined by banks' fixed ratio between deposits and loans. For instance, the 
1995 Commercial Bank Law stipulated that outstanding loans must be no 
larger than 75% of existing deposits. Future plans of strengthening asset-
Iiability management of banking included rationalization of the structure of 
assets and liabilities (for instance, long-term loans must be funded with long-
term deposits). 
3. Increasing competition: Another key element of the reform was to 
increase the level of competition by allowing entry of new competitors： In 
1995，the first private bank, Min Sheng banking Corp., was established 
explicitly to serve China's private firms. Foreign banks were also allowed to 
conduct local currency business in the Pudong district in Shanghai. In January 
1997. four large foreign banks - the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp.. 
Citibank. Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, and the Industrial Bank of Japan—were 
given license to do Renminbi businesses in Pudong. though they were not 





TRUST AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES IN CHINA 
Emergence o f T I C s in China 
TICs were first established in 30s for the liquidity of funds in the market. 
With the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), these early TICs 
were closed, or absorbed by state banks. However, with the launching of reform in 
1979，the State Council took the decision of setting up CITIC. With the growing 
demand for new forms of loans, Bank of China set up a Trust and Advisory 
Department. By the end of 1982, there were already more than 620 trust institutions, 
of which 568 (92 percent) were operated by banks with the rest belonging to local 
governments. 
In view of the financial reforms since 1979. TICs" growth was fueled from at 
least three sources of demand for a new form of financial intermediation. First, with 
the rapid economic growth of the 1980s, state bank lending could no longer meet 
market demand. Banks and bank branches were encouraged to set up Trust 
Departments, which could conduct forms of business prohibited to the formal banks. 
Gradually, these Tnist Departments were spun off to form separate Triisl and 
* 
Investment subsidiaries or affiliates of the banks, with the parent bank being a 
s^ni f icant direct or indirect source of funding. 
Second, with increasing economic decentralization, the channeling off of 
funds proliferated quickly under many state and local governments, as well as 
12 
government agencies. These governments or their agencies sought means to direct 
these funds to finance local priority projects and also to seek higher retums on their 
accumulations than available through bank deposits. They established their own Trust 
and Investment Companies, funded largely by these resources. Third, the central 
government, as parts of its experiments with opening up. encouraged the 
establishment of new experimental agencies which could tap new sources of overseas 
funding, for example, through overseas bond issues. The China International Trust 
and Investment Corporation, CITIC, was created as a ‘.window, for overseas 
borrowing, and important provincial or municipal governments were permitted to set 
up their own International TICs for overseas fund raising. 
Many TICs today are called "companies' but not all are formally incorporated 
under China's Companies Law. In fact, not even all incorporated TICs apply the 
provision of the Law in terms of corporate governance. There are others where, 
despite a lack of formal incorporation, nevertheless, have instated corporate 
governance procedures (e.g.. the appointment of a Board or shareholders, 
representatives). In generaL corporate governance at many TICs still appears weak. 
Development o f T l C s in China 
The Early Trust Industry 
Trust industry in China began as a service of safekeeping properties for banks" 
customers. In 1917, the head office of Shanghai Commercial Savings Bank 
j 
established a custodial department to keep property on behalf of their customers -
f0m1ing the Shanghai Trust Company.^ In 1921, the first specialized trust and 
investment company being known as ' lhe Chinese Commercial Trust Company" was 
(’ It started as the trust department of the Bank, soon it formally turned into the Shanghai 
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found in Shanghai. Twelve more were established in the same year and the most 
influential one was the Central Trust Company7 
After the liberation in 1949, the PRC government tried to develop financial 
institutions with socialistic orientation. Several new Trust and Investment Companies 
were found in large cities like Beijing, Wuhan, Shanghai and Kunming.^ Some 
remarkable ones included the Shanghai branch of People's Bank of China (PBOC) 
[Jan 1949], the Tianjin Trust and Investment Company [Jun 1951], and the Overseas 
Chinese Investment Company in Guangdong [Mar 1955]. However, by the end of 
1950s, because the government implemented the Centralized Economic Plan, these 
Trust and Investment Companies (TICs) became useless under the new system, they 
eventually faded out. . 
TICs in the 80s 
For almost 30 years, these TICs were given no opportunity to revive in China 
until 1979 the launch of Deng Xiaoping's open door policy. Under the former 
centralized system, capital moved vertically from PBOC through the four specialized 
banks lo enterprises. The unused funds usually tended to remain under the control of 
the allocated units even after the project finished. It was very difficult to move these 
funds out when other units needed funding for new projects. Therefore horizontal 
tlow of capital across banks and industrial sectors was encouraged by the state. In 
1979, the State Council decided to set up CITIC. The State Council further supported 
the decision in its 'Provisional rules on Promoting Economic Coalition, which 
nT 
Trust Company, yet it has not been incorporated separately and its business was not specialized . 
7 The principal forms of business were real estate and bill trading; both highly speculative. 
Al l these 12 but 2 ofthese early trust companies collapsed soon. But new otTes emerg^ again with the 
passage of Shanghai's 'banking lavv' in 1937. Trust companies were able to stabilize and their number 
rose to 54 by the end of the 30s. 
8 All those early enterprises were closed or absorbed by state banks when the People's 
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encouraged banks to engage in trust activities in 1980. In a meeting in August the 
same year, the presidents of PBOC announced that enterprises were encouraged to 
deposit their surplus funds with banks as entrusted or trust deposits. By doing so, 
these excess funds, instead of being unused, could then be passed to other companies 
under loan arrangement with banks or through the banks own investment. This 
started to provide a channel for a better horizontal fund flow, hence, promoting 
economic growth. Due to the state's confirmation and support, banks quickly expand 
their own trust businesses. By the end of 1982. there were more than 620 trust 
institutions in China.^ 
After the encouragement by the State and PBOC, many TICs competed 
aggressively for business and deposits which led to disruptions in the national credit 
plan and the distribution of funds under the associated plan. The rapid growth in the 
money supply and domestic credit that occurred at that time laid serious implication 
to the later development of the state's macroeconomic policies. It was suspected that 
many TICs involved in unauthorized borrowing for their corresponding business 
partners:, these entities might use their 'captive" TICs to raise funds for projects that 
were not authorized under the national credit plan: or they might see these TICs as a 
supplementary sources of fund to enhance investments. This made the local 
government or enterprises tend to inflate the forecasts of their authorized investment 
activities under the national credit plan, securing funds for those unauthorized 
activities. In order to control the activities and strengthen the regulation, the State 
Council released the ‘Notification on Rectification of the Trust and Investment 
< 
Republic of China established in 1949. 
A regulation about the control of trust and investment operations was released by PBOC 
in Sept 1980’ known as "The Notification on Activating Trust Industry". Following the regulations 
there was another meeting taken place in Jul 1981’ in which the expansion of trust and investment 
companies was further confirmed in the objectives of promoting horizontal capital movements and 
15 
Business and Strengthening of the Regulation ofRebui ld ing Funds' in April 1982. In 
thisy?rW consolidation, enterprises were forbidden to set up TICs, and only authorized 
'specialized banks' or ‘TICs，could enter trust b u s i n e s s . � For the first time, the trust 
business was brought under the scope of the Credit Plan. However, the situation 
didn't improve due to banks' poor compliance of these regulations. Also, the local 
authorities were actually very reluctant to execute the control as they were too 
aggressive to boost the speed of economic development of their own provinces. 
Hence, in early 1983，these trust and investment businesses were temporarily ceased 
by the PBOC. 
In the same year, the PBOC prepared the first administrative regulations for 
TICs, under 'A Number of Rules on Opening Up Trust Business*. The scope o f t r u s t 
business was more precisely defined, and trust activities resumed. “ By 1984, the 
economy of China grew more rapidly, demanding for greater credit. The new bout of 
overheating led to harsh measures for cooling down the economy and minimized the 
outflow of foreign exchange for (unauthorized) imports. In early 1985. the State 
Council ordered all banks to suspend their trust loan and investment activities again in 
order to reduce the growth in domestic credit. This was the secoml consolidation. 
Because the banks were suspected to mix the trust funds with bank capital so 
to take advantage of lending opportunities, the PBOC publicized the new .Provisional 
Regulations on Financial Trust and Investment Institutions" in Apr 1986 in attempt to 




'° Under the new regulation, TlCs could only be founded by several ‘favoured，provinces 
with individual permissions. • 
“ T r u s t business, as defined under the regulations, was ‘trust, agency, lease and 
consultation'. The PBOC also emphasized their contributions to enhancing economic coalitions in the 
paper. “ 
‘ “ U n d e r the new regulations, all TlCs must be made independent entities from banks. 
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problems involving the management and operations of TICs, with the rapid economic 
growth, the Council could now no longer cease the business as before but to mitigate 
the problems by writing more regulations and laws. Some reactive measures were 
taken in 1987 and 88. By 1988, the number of TICs was reduced from 745 (PBOC 
approved) with recorded assets o f R M B 65 billion, to only about 300 after a cleanup 
action. '^ 
The Latest Development o f T I C s 
Overheating of economy seemed restless. In 1990, TICs were put under 
pressure again due to over-development. After the third consolidation, about 339 
TICs remained. The Spring Tour of Deng to Shenzhen in 1992 heralded a new era of 
growth. TICs mushroomed in the reviving economy. By the end of 1994, the capital 
funds of Trust and Investment Companies amounted to RMBS 53.4 billion. The 
number of registered TICs was about 390 with total assets of RMB$ 390 billion. 
Outstanding trust lending amounted to RMB$ 203 billion. This huge credit growth 
arouse concerns over the leakage from the Credit Plan. Apart from that, the inflation 
‘ together with uncontrolled investment problems led to the fourih consolidation. A 
series of tightened control" was launched which is. in fact, still in its progress now. 
Its objective is to weed out TICs. operation in unauthorized areas of business and to 
consolidate banks and TICs. By the end o f l 9 9 5 , TICs" number fell back to 332. 
Clearly, the transformation from the centrally planned economy o f l 9 7 8 lo the 
1998 environment has been dramatic. Development of TICs encouraged the 
mobilization of surplus cash between enterprises, government, institutes and similar 
<r 
Authority of PBOC over the establishment and supervisions of the new TICs has also been 
consolidated. 
I: It was rumored to number around 1,000 de facto, according to a report ofthe World Bank 
14 This included the tightening of credit limits and access to credits bv TICs. 
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sources. TICs hold these funds in trust for the respective depositors. During the 
holding period, these funds were invested in approved projects under the supervision 
of the State Council. On the other hand, foreigners were given more opportunities to 
invest in the active bond market, commodities market and the increasingly open 
insurance and trust sectors. 
However, one can also see that the development of TICs had been rather 
cyclical. They emerged and grew rapidly along with economic growth. But once 
these TICs were found to invest in activities outside the national credit plan, i.e. 
actions that adversely affected the state's macroeconomic policies, harsh measures 
were implemented to stop them. The TICs suffered declines and their activities 
shrank again. These iips and downs repeated in 1982, 1986, 1988 and 1994, signaling 
the four consolidations in TICs' history. The newest problem exploded in 1998 when 
GITIC announced its bankruptcy, the first TIC bankruptcy in China. The question is 
whether the history is repeating itself again. 
Business Activities o fTICs 
Business activities of TICs are diverse. Basically TICs should concentrate in 
•agency businesses", where the TICs act as financial fiduciaries, taking 'agency 
deposits，from institutional clients for non-discretionary loans and investments. In 
other words, they are just the executors who follow instructions from clients in these 
activities. They make no advice and bear no credit risk. The source ofrevenue in this 
part of business is commission received for performing 'these activities on behalf of 
clients. 
r 
According the regulations, TICs can also make their own investments. 
Granting of loans is the primary investments o fTICs . Their loan portfolios generally 
account for 90% of the i r assets, which is much greater than the proportions in banks. 
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Besides, TICs can make investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures and hold equity 
positions in other companies. 
Many TICs today engage in securities trading on behalf of their clients and 
many are dealers of their own accounts. The majority of seats on the Stock Exchange 
of Shanghai as well as Shenzhen are owned by TICs. In recent years, TICs have also 
participated in more risky areas ofbiisiness such as underwriting of securities. 
Other business activities in that TICs engage include trading of state bond, 
financial leasing, property holding, debts' guarantee, and financial consulting. 
ITICs 
ITICs basically undertake the same functions as TICs in China (See Table 1.4 
in Appendix: Summary of TICs and ITICs ’ Activities). However, due to their special 
status which allow them to engage in offshore activities and raise overseas funds, they 
usually have their overseas activities a much heavier proportion in their portfolio. 
They also have closer connections with foreign companies. They are designated as 
"window companies' for raising foreign capital, and have been China's largest 
overseas bond issuers. The funding sources of ITICs are strictly controlled by 
authorities. Borrowing is mostly in $US or Yen being swapped into $US. ITICs 
usually do not engage in direct or secondly exchange risks themselves. Today, many-
larger ITICs are given credit ratings by overseas rating agencies, and some of them do 
not require government guarantees for their debt issues 
Funding 
‘ Funding o f T I C s largely consists of deposits from various s o u r c e s + � T I C s are 
I) The Provisional Regulations of December 1986 established a list of five eligible sources of 
funding, generally as (1) the government treasures, (2) government departments and administrative 
enterprises, (3) labor protection or insurance funds. (4) scientific research institutions, and (5) academic 
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primarily capitalized by these deposits and other types of assets, including real estates. 
Trusted and entrusted deposits'^ account for most of the deposits, which compose of 
about 55% of their total funding. In this respect of lending activities, they are 
essentially the same as commercial banks. However, funding from deposits has 
dropped slightly in recent years, and interbank deposits has become an increasingly 
important source of funding. These TICs have actively engaged in the interbank 
market to raise funds for various projects, particularly in the real estate sector. They 
also had close tie with affiliated securities and finance companies」？ 
Figure 1.1 (See Appendix) suggested that entrusted deposits, which composed 
of more than 60% of the total deposits, have been far more significant than trust 
deposits in total funding. Since the distinction between two is blurry in practice, TICs 
prefer to label deposits as entrusted deposits as these are exempted from the reserve 
requirements to which trust deposits are subject. 
TICs are permitted to issue their own bonds or stocks with the permission of 
PBOC. But. in practice, they have not fully made use of the domestic capital market 
due to quota restriction. 
Regulations and Legal Position o f T I C s 
Over the past 17 years of reform, there were only very few systematic attempts 
institutes and other foundations. 
16 Entrusted deposits are funds for designated projects and are held in trust until needed to 
finance implementation. Trust deposits are surplus funds that are not targeted for any special use. Both 
of them are the major categories for TICs' deposits. The third category, 'agency deposits' is also 
sometimes referred to. However, the distinction between them is blurred and practically arrangement 
between these categories have been widespread. 
, 17 We should notice that these TICs were not only active in borrowing but also lending, 
reflecting that transfer of funds (or assets) from specialized banks to their affiliated TICs, via the 
interbank market, was obvious, and as expected. This was probably due to the restrictions on direct 
transfer placed by PBOC. Banks were able to evade credit control through these ‘public，activities in 
the market, and such leakage to TICs has been identified as a major source of the inflationary pressures 
in early 1993. To cope with such loophole, the central government has sought to place limits on bank 
transfer to TICs starting from 1993. In August 1995, the State Council proposed that specialized banks 
are forbidden from setting up TlCs as mechanism of avoiding central bank credit controls, lt required 
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on TICs' regulation in the early years. With the growing concern on the credit issues 
and the investment risk, the nature and scope of TICs' businesses were firstly defmed 
in April 1986 under 'Provisional Regulations on Financial Trust and Investment 
Institutions' issued by the PBOC. The objective was to strengthen the administration 
of TICs and to promote the development of China's financial trust industry. For the 
first time，these regulations stated the requirement of separating TICs from the banks' 
business completely. In the same year, on 24th December, the PBOC issued the 
'Provisional Regulations on (RMB) Funds Management in Financial Trust and 
Investment Companies \ which clarified definitions, established minimum financial 
requirements for the first time, and set out detailed procedures for reporting 
requirements of TICs to PBOC. Although the 1986 Regulations provided the legal 
framework on administrations o fTICs , they did not give comprehensive guidelines on 
the scope ofbusiness , which continued to diversify and expand. 
As TICs became a major player in the securities market, they vvere subject to 
regulations, including the 'Provisional Measures on Administration of Securities 
Firms ‘ issued in 1990. The provision set out the basic financial requirement on 
conducting the securities business, and confirmed PBOC"s regulatory role with 
respect to securities firms. This responsibility was later transferred to the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission ( C S R C f when it established in 1992. 
Tighter control vvas implanted since 1992. Several new regulations on TICs 
vvere issued in 1993，1994, 1995 and 1996. Regulations in 1993 defined and set out 
additional requirements for the usage of entrusted funds. '^ The pass of a financial 
legislation in 1995 officially stated PBOC as the central bank for the PRC and 
all specialized banks to disaffiliate themselves from their TICs. 
18 CSRC is given the powers similar to that of the US Securities Exchange Commission 
'^  The Business Rules on Designated Trust Loans for Financial Trust and Investment 
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empowered it to supervise and regulate the financial services industry. ^^  This put 
TICs under its supervision. Finally, on 6''^  August 1996，regulations were set out in 
greater detail on the financial requirements for TICs. ^' 
As one can see, most of the key laws and regulations have been drafted and 
passed during the period 1992-1995, some of which, under the Securities Law and the 
Trust Law, are still awaiting ratification. Here is a summary of some important 
captions: 
Minimize Legal Capital 
According to the Provisional Regulations of April 1986，the minimum paid-up 
capital was RMB $50 millions for national TIC, RMB $10 millions for a provincial 
TIC and RMB $5 millions for a district or city TIC. In the 1994 regulation'", there 
vvas no longer specification of financial requirements. It was only stated in the 
regulation that capital requirements might be prescribed by PBOC at any time when it 
was necessary, without the need to describe the basis on which they would be 
determined. 
. As stipulated in the Regulations on NBF1 in Foreign Exchange Transaction 
(1992) and the Admmistratkm of Foreign Exchange Business Provisions (1993), a 
national TIC which engages in foreign exchange business must have at least US$ 15 
millions of paid iip capital in spot exchange. While a provincial TIC needs US$ 7.5 
million or equivalent. 
* 
^ 
Companies, issued by PBOC. 
20 The People's Bank ofChina Law. 
" ' T h e Notice by the People's Bank of China Regarding the Publication of Provisional 
Measures of the Financial Trust and Investment Companies for Assets-Liabilities Ratio Management. 
“ T h e Provisional Regulations for the Administration of Financial Institutions. 
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Location and Ownership 
TICs are allowed in large and middle-sized cities in China. By 1988, the state 
had decided that financial markets should operate only in cities where business 
volume was adequate to ensure profitable operations. However, the definition of 
'profitable operation' was not clear and it had not been strictly enforced anyway. 
TICs can only be owned by authorized Chinese banks and local governments. 
The State Council only controls one TIC directly, which is the China International 
Trust and Investment Corporations (CITIC). The state also has equity interests in 
other TICs. Provincial and municipal TICs cannot establish branches in China or 
abroad, and TICs are barred from dealing with non-financial enterprises without the 
approval o fPBOC. . 
Supervision 
Structure of shareholders and minimum qualifications of senior staff must be 
specified by PBOC. The 1994 regulation also requires the separation of banking, 
trust, insurance and securities business under TICs. While the new laws have 
‘ introduced conditions for TICs establishment, capital adequacy and shareholder 
protections, details have not been specified. Other important issues like the multiple 
forms of business that TICs undertake, reporting requirements, risk management and 
even supervision responsibilities are still left ambiguous, which lay the trap of 
arguments when crisis occurs. 
Most TICs have their own internal audit department, and PBOC performs 
audits periodically to check their compliance with guidelines based on the materials 
< 
prepared by the internal audit. -^  However, there is generally an absence of checks 
•” The frequency of checking has not been stated in legal documents. It would be decided 
by PBOC under necessary condition. 
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and balances on their corporate governance and a lack of culture of compliance within 
TICs, which is also a common phenomenon among most Chinese SOEs (State Owned 
Enterprises). Moreover, currently, there is still not a complete standard of accounting 
requirement for financial reporting of investments of TICs. Except for TICs that are 
listed in stock exchanges, financial statements do not require the examination of 
external auditors. 
Prudential Ratios 
PBOC included financial ratios control in the monitoring o f T I C s in 1994，and 
these ratios were specified in the Notice Regarding the Publication of Provisional 
Measures ofthe Financial Trust and Investment Institutions for Asset Liability Ratio 
% 
Management. As required, TICs need to submit a monthly retum to PBOC, which 
measures their key financial ratios. Limits are set on (a) capital adequacy ratio, (b) 
loan to deposit ratio, (c) investment ratios, that is the percentage of long term 
investment to total capital，（d) reserve ratio, (e) liquidity ratio, (f) asset placement, (g) 
interbank ratio, (h) past due loan ratio, (i) diversification ratio and (j) external 
.. guarantee restrictions Refer to Appendix for details). 
Yet loopholes remain. As mentioned in the previous section, since there are 
not adequate standards for financial reporting on TICs. the interpretation of financial 
ratios differs from one to another. These ratios lack the relevance as a risk 
management tool, which makes compatibility impossible. 
Participation in the Interbank Market 
, As suggested in the 1986 Provisional Regulations, participation of TICs in 
interbank market was permitted, where they were allowed to negotiate loans with 
other TICs or banks in the purpose to channel fund supply. For the first time, the 
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interbank market was defined in 1990 under the Provisional Regulations of Interbank 
Market Transactions. It defines interbank transactions as short-term transactions 
among banks and NBFIs. Terms of contracts are to be negotiated by the two parties. 
PBOC and its branches would be responsible for administrating, organizing, 
supervising and auditing the transactions. Average daily balance of these interbank 
transactions must not exceed 5% of the total deposit balance in the previous month. 
Actually, the original notion of allowing interbank market activities is only for 
supplementing shortfalls of temporary circulating funds and payments in financial 
bills. Institutions are prohibited from using the interbank market to raise funds for 
investments in fixed assets. 
Poor compliance with these regulations is coupled vvith weak enforcement. As 
already mentioned, NBFIs have been actively borrowing and lending in the interbank 
market, and, obviously, these transactions are not only for the purpose of fund 
regulating. Lots of the funds borrowed in the interbank market are used to invest in 
risky business such as ventures and real estate. However, the time of payback of these 
investment is highly affected by the market performance, making it very uncertain. A 
major concern o f th i s phenomenon is the unlimited extension of these "overdue loans" 
when they could not be repaid as expected. They would rollover the original loan or 
borrow another short-term loan to cover these overdue loans. The overuse of these 
unmatched loans reflects that these TICs are too optimistic and risk loving. Moreover, 
interest rates of borrowing in the interbank market is usually much higher, which 
4 
increases the risk of investment and make it fall beyond the normal monitoring area. 
•r 
The Role o fTICs in the Economic Reform 
The growth of TICs occurred in an environment where non-traditional new 
financial institutions, or the non-hank financial instiliitions (NBFIs), were emerging 
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with the confirmation of economic reform in the 80s. By the end of 1995, these NBFI 
were the source of about 11% of all funding circulated in the market, while the state 
banks absorbed about 78% of the business. 
The growth of these TICs' asset was not as significant as other NBFIs in the 
earlier years, yet it's assets remained much higher than these rivals as of the end of 
1995. Also these TICs have long been the major competitors of deposits and loans 
with the state banks, which was probably one of the cause of those credit concerns. 
Obviously TICs have been important in the economic reform as the main 
source of funding. To what extent are funds ‘diverted’ from the state banks to these 
NBFIs, especially the TICs? Why did they grow so rapidly even after four 
consolidations? First, the State Council wanted to promote the horizontal flow of 
capital. The TICs have functions that can fulfill such purpose. Secondly, these 
institutions could be competitors of local banks in the local business sectors where 
they are allowed to operate, therefore provide these banks some initiatives to improve. 
Most important is that. TICs provide a mechanism for local government to secure 
funding for approved projects. Over the past 30 years between 1952 to 1980, the state 
provides 82% of the funding for capital construction or investments. By 1990. it was 
providing only 38%. obviously the provincial and municipal governments as well as 
the foreign investors now play a much greater role in financial capital construction. 
From a western institution's perspective. TICs are hybrids between traditional trust 
companies and development banks. It accepts deposit like a usual trust company in 
Western countries, while it also apply the funds as approved by the state, like a 
development bank. 
Chinese banks also welcome the TICs development as they can use them to 
circumvent some banking regulations. Here are some examples: (1) Credit Limits: 
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when a bank nearly reaches its approved credit limits, it can refer the potential client 
to the TIC and charge the agency fee. (2) Interest Rates: TICs can avoid the interest-
rate regulations by charging extra service fees (like agency fees, legal fees, insurance 
and consultation, etc.) or other devices (like restructuring of the interest calculation 
method) to raise the "effective" interest rate, while these "tricks" are not allowed in 
general banks. 
Provincial and municipal governments tend to use TICs to circumvent the 
national credit limit and raise funds for approved projects. They also like to use TICs 
to borrow overseas to obtain foreign exchange in order to supplement allocations from 
SAEC. However, there are only very few TICs (e.g. Guangdong International Trust 
and Investment Corporation) have the approval to borrow overseas. . 
In conclusion, TICs are always viewed as a 'extension departments' of their 
sponsors. They are established to handle a variety of activities including project 
management, the issuing of securities, consultancy, and leasing. The emphasis of 
regional development in China has pressured local governments to take every 
conceivable measure to procure funds for regional development. 
Some Important TICs and ITICs 
Large national ITICS owned by government account for the majority of total 
assets in the TICs business. They are usually characterized by considerable emphasis 
on overseas borrowing and a predominance of direct lending for local developmental 
purposes. Successful examples of these government owned ITICs are CITIC (China 
International Trust and Investment Corporation, based in Beijing), GITIC 
<r 
(Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation). SITICO (Shanghai 
International Trust and Investment Corporation), BITIC (Beijing International Trust 
and Investment Corporation). HITIC (Hubei International Trust and Investment 
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Corporation) and DITIC (Dalian International Trust and Investment Corporation). 
Until the enactment of the 1995 regulation, many active TICs were owned by 
banks. However, after the tighter restriction on business separation has been 
implemented, many of them have been absorbed by their parent banks. By 1996, 
ICBC (The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) declared a holding of 69 TICs 
while CBC (Construction Bank of China) said that it had 46 only. The TICs being 
owned by the two development banks, which are the ICBC-TIC and CBC-TIC, are 
more important TICs in this sector because of its national level. 
Here under is a brief description on some important national and provincial 
TICs in China today. They are introduced to readers for a better understanding 
because of their national status - CITIC, ICBC-TIC and CBC-TIC - or the special 
economic and political status of the provincial governments that they belong to - the 
GITIC in Guangdong, SITICO in Shanghai and BITIC in Beijing. 
National Level TICs 
CITlC - the Most Oiilstandms ITIC 
. China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) was established 
by the People's Republic of China (PRC) government in late 1978 as part of the 
country's sweeping development efforts in the agricultural, industrial, science and 
technology and defense sectors (also known as the Four Modernizations). It is the 
largest TIC in China, state-owned, reporting directly to the State Council and 
headquartering in Beijing. Legally it has the status same, as a ministry in the national 
government, which means that under Chinese law it could not be declared bankrupt, 
<r 
and if it was dissolved the State Council would need to form a new, solvent entity to 
assume CITIC's obligations. 
In 1996，CITIC held RMB 191.5 billion ($23.07 billion US) in gross assets. 
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net assets o f R M B 21.3 billion ($2.57 billion US), and made RMB 2.47 billion ($297 
million US) in profit, 21% better than in the previous year. 
CITIC is structured as a conglomerate. It has 31 subsidiaries, including 7 
overseas, and over 40% of its investments are overseas. Obviously this investment 
pattern is quite different from the other TICs. Also, its scope of business is extremely 
wide, including the provision of finance, production, trade, technology transfer, 
services, foreign investment promotion and other related business. As of 1998, 
CITIC's ownership interest includes an industrial bank, a commercial bank in Hong 
Kong, a US steel plant, and telecommunications, transport and manufacturing 
ventures. The conglomerate's major task is to 'utilize funds from Chinese, Hong 
Kong, and Macao compatriots' and foreign nationals for long term investments in 
China, to organize joint ventures or cooperative production; to undertake leasing 
business; and to make investments with the foreign funds it raised. It operates under 
the Law on Chinese Foreign Joint Ventures and other relevant laws, decrees and 
regulations." (The China Handbook Editorial Committee. 1990) 
ICBC-TIC 
As a national level TIC belongs to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, it is also ICBC"s wholly owned subsidiary. Establishing in 1985. it had total 
assets worth RMB 6.7 billion by the end of 1995. Its major business includes 
investment in light industry, printing, textiles, and heavy industry in Inner Mongolia. 
» 
Its trust and securities departments have also grown steadily. From 1991 -1995 , 
IGBC-TIC was rated the top ten TICs in China on the national scale. Its other 
activities include designated entrusted loans, deposits and financial leasing. 
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CBC-TIC 
Again, it is the principal national level TIC under the Construction Bank of 
China. Its major source of funds is entrusted and trust deposits. It mainly provides 
capital for infrastructure projects, particularly roads and power stations. It also 
operates a securities business, and is member of 7 stock exchanges and stock centers 
in China. 
Provincial Level TICs 
GITIC - the Lc1r2est ITICs inside the Territory of China 
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corporation was an 
t 
exceptional success among the regional ITICs in China. By 1997, it had an estimated 
asset size o f U S $ 5.5 billion"^. Its scope of business is wide and diversified, ranging 
from construction projects to complicated financial deals (see Table). Before its 
bankruptcy in October 1998. it vvas always referred as the most prosperous ITIC next 
to CITIC. 
What made GITIC so outstanding was its "background" — it vvas backed by the 
Guangdong Provincial Government and locating in the province of most outstanding 
economic performance in China today. Obviously. GITIC"s rise was part o f a boarder 
trend across China toward local financial powerhouse. The decentralization of central 
economy made GITIC an important source to finance vilal infrastructure projects and 
to compete for overseas money. GITIC has gained the position as the center of the 
drive to raise funds under China's sharp economic growth. 
< 
GITIC was the largest investor in industry and infrastructure in Guangdong, 
24 Regional TICs are relatively smaller iii size with most having assets of less than RMB 1 
billion. 
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the fastest growing region of China with a growing rate of 15% per year. GITIC was 
also one of the first provincial TIC that Beijing permitted to raise funds in the 
overseas equity market. In 1994, market expected that GITIC would have its assets 
and profi ts jump by 15 - 18% annually when reached the year o f2000 . 
S!TICO 
The Shanghai International Trust and Investment Corporation is 85% owned 
by the Shanghai Municipality, with total assets of RMB 23.4 billion by the end of 
1995. Established in 1981, it plays an important role in the economic development in 
Shanghai as a development bank. It has equity investments in more than 120 unlisted 
enterprises and is a major shareholder in the Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corporation. It also has investments in real estates, hotels and land development. It 
facilitates many contracts between the Municipality and overseas manufacturers and 
actively involves in foreign technology transfer. 
SITICO has injected significant funds in the Pudong development area and it 
is a major shareholder of 3 Pudong companies. SITICO is also the shareholder of 
Shanghai International Securities Company, the largest securities company of China 
until 1995 when it suffered from a speculative failure. The coming plan o fS ITICO is 
to be restructured into a new holding company, with a bank, a securities firm and 
investment company under a holding parent. 
BlTIC 
‘ The Beijing International and Trust Corporation is 100% owned by the Beijing 
Municipality. With more than 15 departments, BITIC has equity and loan 
investments in infrastructure projects, investment leasing, trust, securities and other 
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overseas investments in Hong Kong and US (California). Sometimes it will invest in 
projects as directed by the municipality, like the Yanshen Project. BITIC also acts as 
guarantor for some SOE's working capital financing. Its principal source of funds is 






THE GITIC INCIDENT 
On March 26, 1997，a GITIC's subsidiary, the Gitic Enterprise issued 100 
million of shares on the stock exchange of Hong Kong. The offer had ignited a 
storm, in which buyers oversubscribed the shares by 892 times. They borrowed 
heavily to place as deposit on their bids, leading to a pool of HK$13 billion in 
overnight time that sent the HIBOR soaring by nearly one and a half percentage 
» 
points. This IPO (initial public offering) marked the zenith of the ‘Red Heat’ in 
Hong Kong's stock market. 
There has been some time of fantasy, when the share price of Gitic Enterprise 
has boosted due to rumors that GITIC would inject funds into the company, when 
investors were still thinking that foreign investors and the government would support 
‘ these TICs without asking any hard questions, when the financial performance of 
TICs still looked 'good" to outsiders. However, all these were like bubbles, sadly 
found later. 
Most investors were very optimistic to the future of those "window-
companies ' at that time. They believed that the Chinese government, either 
provincially or nationally, would support these companies without any doubt. Under 
that atmosphere, though there have been some analysts from investment banks 
r 
warning the public for the overheating, probably very few had really listened to them. 
They were not calm enough to feel the underneath danger of that naive thinking, but 
also no one would expect that the situation could turn up so bad. 
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The first clue happened in October 1997. With the Asian crisis cutting 
earnings at CITIC Pacific, investors threw their shares crazily that sent the stock down 
by 70% from its peak in July 1997. Then there the Hainan International Trust and 
Investment Corporation announced that it had been losing money since 1996 and was 
not able to repay a one year US$7 million loan. These incidents started to raise the 
concern of foreign investors - surprisingly many TICs were actually in an operating 
loss for all these years, yet they were still borrowing money and investing heavily in 
various risky projects. The foreign lenders uncovered the fact that the projects they 
invested in weren't able to generate projects they expected. Indeed, the returns were 
even too slight to repay debts. Immediately, foreign investors stopped flowing in 
funds and started to investigate how many 'unknowns' were behind the TICs they, had 
invested before. 
Then it spread out like tumors. First, it vvas CITIC in serious financial ruin. 
Fortunately. China's Financial Ministry was willing to inject US$4.5 million to save 
the company. GITIC is not the same lucky. After the problem has exposed for about 
one year, on October 6. 1998. Beijing authorities, being alarmed at GITlC's 
staggering debts, announced the closing of GITIC. A consultant team, which 
included the former Chairman Mr. Huang Yantian. was set iip to resolve the debt 
problem o fGITIC . 
After the exposure of the issue, the Beijing government declared that ITICs 
were not the same as state banks - they relied heavily on foreign currency loan for 
i 
more than 70% of their borrowings. What is even worse, it was also announced that 
the government would not back all of the debt. At the same time，Beijing's 
bureaucrats started to realize that China's exposure to foreign borrowing is far more 
than they have expected. Funds borrowed by these ITICs vvere poured into risky 
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investments such as office towers and condominiums, which were items suffered most 
seriously in the Asian crisis. According to a Moody's study, those government 
authorities who monitored the ITICs actually had no position to object if these bets go 
sour. 
Many small cities throughout the province were found linked to tremendous 
debt related to GITIC. Subsequent investigation revealed that the GITIC probably 
carried a debt of US$3.6 billion with about US$1.6 billion in foreign currencies. 
Most of them were short-term loans, though they were used to finance long term 
projects. Gitic Enterprise - its arm in Hong Kong, owed a further US$850 million. In 
addition to a guaranteed loan of about US$1.8 billion on other Chinese companies, 
which are almost 5 times o f i t s capital, GITIC had a total debt of nearly US$6 billion. 
Guangdong has once tried to raise US$1.7 billion from some Japanese and 
Korean banks to save GITIC. However, Premier Zhu Rongji sent a message to local 
officials and foreign bankers, saying that no one would be so powerful to guarantee 
the survival of these ITICs. He then decided to close it in October and put the firm 
under the management of the Bank of China. PBOC has promised to honor GITlC.s 
debts previously registered with SAEC of China, but how long it would take and to 
which creditors it would pay first still remains uncertain. 
Yet. it was not the end of the story. On Januai.y 11. 1999 GITIC was forced by 
the central government to file for bankruptcy. So far. it is the first bankruptcy of 
ITICs and also the biggest financial corporation failure. 
Some foreign bankers thought that they would be able to recover 60% of their 
debt and they would be given priority in debt repayment, as promised by the central 
bank officials last October when the company shut down. However, many of them 
who lent to GITIC had not registered their loans with the central authorities. They 
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might even get no payback in the end. The Banking Law applied in China shocked 
them that foreign lenders may not be given priorities in the repayment. In fact, the 
detail terms are still being discussed. As a matter of fact, by forcing the GITIC into 
bankruptcy, the central government recognized the alarming hazards of guaranteeing 
the obligations of multi-stake borrowers. Officials also admitted that the GITIC issue 





IMPACT AND IMPLICATION OF THE GITIC INCIDENT 
Possible Problems Lead to the Failure 
In view of the case of GITIC and the failure of other TICs, it has been found 
that there are both internal and external problems. Internally, these TICs usually had 
very poor management and supervisory systems which made it difficult to monitor. 
Externally, their connection with the government and related bodies is so complicated 
that efficient management is nearly impossible - it is not only the problem of their 
human capital, even if they had the best managers, their abilities were restricted by the 
reality of entangled relationship with the government. Not until the business sector 
become more independent of the central control, would the problem be solved. 
1. Entangled Connection ^vith Govcrnmeni - Business of TICs is diversified 
without adequate concentration. Their range of service has grown to include 
commercial banking, trust services, guarantees, direct investment, fund 
management, consulting and project management. Moreover, the "trust 
business' in China has close connections with different levels of government, 
government agencies or state owned enterprises. That is probably also a 
reason why the TICs in China do not resemble elsewhere in the world. This 
‘ connection makes it difficult for policy makers to define framework for 
legistration or supervision. It also makes the task of risk management 
extremely complicated because too many levels of authorities can override the 
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normal management decisions. In fact, problems of investment and 
management started to surface in the 1990s when TICs reduced their 
traditional lending and investment activities and increased their exposure to 
property development and stock brokerage. These TICs were born as a kind 
of hidden reserve for provincial governments. They were forced by local 
governments to make investments in local projects or give loans to local 
enterprises. Together with the lack of monitoring, lots of investment problems 
were caused. 
2. Risk Management — (i) Lack of Standard: The GITIC crisis told many 
investors that the TICs problem could be much more serious than what the 
financial statements would reflect. This is because the financial statements of 
TICs have not disclosed their condition adequately or accurately reflected the 
operations of their business. The lack of accounting standard is the major 
reason. This makes the reports misleading and additionally difficult to initiate 
supervisory remedies, (ii) Lack of Transparency: Another problem is the lack 
of transparency in China's management system. Detailed financial reports and 
consistent government statistics are hard to come by. Asset quality of banks 
and state-owned enterprises, therefore, are hard to assess. In the case of 
GITIC, the huge amount of loan guarantees and mysterious loans were only 
discovered after the exposure of the event, (iii) Lack of Differentiation: 
Because of the wide range of activities that TICs engaged, its very difficult to 
» 
apply the same supervisory norms and procedures on all activities. Moreover, 
‘ the poor accounting separation of different forms of business that a TIC 
operates intensifies this problem. They usually only report summary figures in 
which a wide range of business are concerned. Such arrangement will 
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enhance confusion and makes monitoring very difficult. 
3. Supervision - First, there is insufficient coordination between the PBOC head 
office and its branches, in the supervision of TICs. Since PBOC headquarters 
supervises central TICs and leaves the supervision of lower level TICs to local 
PBOC branches, which are usually ill-operated, the quality of supervision is 
uneven and norms for supervision are not uniformly applied. A branch may 
be required to follow certain new monitoring rules released by the 
government, but in practice the majority of monitoring decisions is made with 
complete autonomy by local offices. Such a decentralized structure also 
makes local PBOC branches susceptible to local political pressures to fund 
investment projects and to keep unprofitable state enterprises alive. Second, 
PBOC's supervision usually concentrates more on the approval of new TICs 
rather than the on-going supervision of the existing ones. Even the current 
monitoring relies heavily on tedious reporting, which however are not 
received regularly, and lapses in submission are not always followed up. 
4. Unhedged Foreign Exchange Exposure - Most TICs have increased their off-
balance-sheet exposure, mostly in the form of loan guarantees. Some 70% of 
the big trusts' borrowing are in foreign currency. If Reminbi devalues, the 
damage to the trusts would be huge. GITIC had extended guarantees equal to 
almost five times its own capital at the end of 1997. The central bank has 
promised to honor GITIC debt previously registered with China's State 
t 
Administration of Foreign Exchange. However, how long it will take and 
‘ which of its creditors will be paid back first remains uncertain. 
5. Questionable Quality and liquidity of Investments - Investments on lots of 
SOEs are illiquid and insolvent. Loans to insolvent SOEs became frozen in ‘ 
3 9 
the books of TICs. Besides, due to the encouragement by PBOC to TICs to 
seek the highest rate of return from their operations in earlier years, TICs have 
engaged actively in a wide range of activities that are beyond their core 
businesses and extremely risky, like an excessive amount of real estate 
investment. For instance, the trust of Shanghai, Guangdong, and others were 
big property developers and lenders when real estate vvas slumping from 1993 
-1995 . There was also found a high degree of risk concentration, not only in 
real estates or construction but also in other sectors such as agriculture, which 
are subject to seasonal fluctuations and natural disasters. TICs usually do not 
compute risk concentration ratios. 
In fact, TICs have increasingly ventured into new high risk areas in the 
securities business. Initially, TICs have restricted themselves from engaging 
in operating as brokers for clients. However, knowing the profit potential and 
prosperity of the business, many of them started to actively involve and take 
greater risks by dealing on their own account and adopting market positions. 
6. Unstable Funding and Mismatches in Asset Liquidity Terms - As mentioned, a 
major source of fund to TICs. second only to deposits, has been the interbank 
market. TICs like to use short term funding from interbank market to support 
long term investment projects. This created the mismatches between funding 
and investment. If the investment projects vvent wrong, the TICs would not be 
able to repay the short-term debt in sooner time. 
t 
7. Spill-over Effect - After the incident of GITIC, the market has now turned 
‘ brutally against most Chinese credits, including “red chips," state-controlled 
entities registered and listed in Hong Kong. The index of their shares fell by 
more than 12% on January 13^ '^  alone. The GITIC collapse will cast its 
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shadow for some time to come. Most foreign banks-not just the Japanese, 
Hong Kong and European ones that are GITIC's main casualties - are 
rethinking their China strategies. China's bankruptcy law, passed in 1986 but 
scarcely tested, seems to rank westem banks' unsecured lending behind not 
only secured lenders, but also the claims of employees and tax authorities. 
This is another reason why western bankers may in future be quicker to stay 
away from the troubled Chinese companies. 
In addition, the smaller TICs will be under greater pressure to rescue 
their external creditors - too, given the diminishing liquidity confronted by 
other financial institutions in the region. Other non-financial company, 
Guangdong Enterprises (GDE), was also challenged. Even CITIC Pacific is 
now trading at less than two-thirds the value of the underlying assets in its 
portfolio. 
The Dilemma 
By forcing GITIC into bankruptcy, the central government is recognizing the 
. alarming hazards of guaranteeing the obligations of murk>' state borrowers. The 
GITIC case posed a dilemma. On the one hand. China counts heavily on foreign 
financing. In the early days. ITICs were set up as the foreign-window of provinces 
and localities. But, as many senior official admitted, with localities not allowed to run 
budget deficits, ITICs have become the ..treasury arms of local government". When 
the returns from pet projects (power stations, toll roads, and the like) began to fall, 
they jumped into ever riskier businesses and plunged into share-trading and property 
<r 
development. GITIC, for instance, is the biggest property developer in southern 
China, with 200 projects and 10m metres of space. 
On the other hand, the easy availability of foreign credit, in particular to the 
41 
largest of China's 240-odd trust and investment corporations (ITICs), has led to such 
wayward-and often corrupt-investments that put the whole fabric of China's 
development at risk. Political, as much as economic, control, has to be reasserted. 
Collapse of Confidence 
It is obvious that one major impact of the GITIC incident is the collapse of 
investors’ confidence. In fact, many banks that lent to GITIC without registering their 
loans with the central authorities may get no payback. They were assured by central-
bank officials last October that registered lenders would be at the front of the 
creditors' queue and would get their money back. But it has tumed out that all the 
loan registrations, state and provincial guarantees and “comfort letters" with which 
* 
foreign loans eventually counted for little. 
Worries about the TICs' liquidity and asset-quality problems are currently 
shaking what is already a fragile financial system. Troubled non-bank financial 
institutions could slow Premier Zhu Rongji's banking and state-enterprise reforms. If 
more companies can not get their money back, this could have a knock-on effect on 
., their ability to do business. In the worst scenario, investor confidence could be 
further out ofcontrol. forcing a running of the TICs. 
Burden on State Banks 
TICs represent just 3.3% of all assets held by the country's financial 
institutions, but their failure would be a tremendous burden on the banks. China's 
t 
state banks are already staggering under the weight of about $200 billion in non-
performing loans. But if Beijing ordered them to come to the rescue every time non-
bank financial intermediaries run into trouble, that, in turn, would perpetuate a moral 
hazard and encourage risky lending and investments. Thus, in spite of all the talk of 
4 2 
restructuring and commercializing the banks, China has a long way to go if the state 
banks have to absorb the losses. 
If companies assumed to have the backing of provincial authorities-if not 
central ones-go under, foreign investors will be forced to reassess the creditworthiness 
of all Chinese borrowers. It would be harder for prosperous coastal provinces to 
attract foreign financing. And while the Bank of China may back GITIC's debt, it 
probably cannot afford to cover all the obligations of investment trusts. The fallout of 
a wave of bankruptcies would be messy and hazardous, and could badly shake the 
whole China's financial system. 
Implications of GITIC Case 
» 
1. Foreign Investors ‘ Attitude Towards Investments in China — Despite of the 
problems vvith GITIC, foreign investors seemed to be over-relied on the 
“window” company status of GITIC led to the fact that they had been too 
generously lending money vvith little regard to risk factors. Much of GITIC's 
foreign borrowing had the approval of the State Administration of Foreign 
.. Exchange. Bankers considered approval to be tantamount to a state guarantee. 
Despite the fact that GITIC's loan guarantees were eventually equivalent to 
five times its capital at the end of 1997. only a few investors had shown 
serious concern over who will assume the responsibility for making good on 
any guaranteed lending that is not repaid when loans go sour. 
On the other face of the coiii, there might also be a different story. 
Though most investors had admitted their over reliance and lack of awareness 
< 
of the credit risks behind these TICs after the incident broke out, its too much 
a coincidence for all large corporations had the same negligence. Instead of 
being careless, since all corporations were competing for businesses in China. 
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if your own company stayed back, you might lose the market share when 
things had not tumed bad. Just like in the stock market, when the whole 
market was so bullish, very few investors would dare to make the first bearish 
decision as they are the minority. They didn't have that confidence since the 
optimal time of leaving the market vvas difficult to catch, in the hope of 
earning the last coin, they were probably betting on their luck with the others. 
They were not unaware, they were just trying the edge. The blame of 
negligence was possibly an excuse of their over-aggressiveness only 
2. Poor sense of Compliance in Chinese Culture - Concept of compliance and is 
poor. Actually it's a general defect in the mindset shared by most local 
Chinese. Chinese always thought that strict control system implies inflexible 
business relationship. Checking on the work of others is always something not 
nice to do. Internal audit is never a welcomed department as the work is too 
'embarrassing". All these improper concepts make compliance difficult to 
implement in China. Moreover, quality compliance also refers to a sense of 
self-awareness and self-control. When talking about these conceptual issues, 
poor education is probably the root of the whole problem. In another word, 
there is a lack o f ' s ense of compliance, in Chinese culture. 
3. The Ownership Structure - The ownership structure of TICs also led lo 
problems with risk management. Under the current system, state owned 
enterprises (such as GITC) receive their funding from other SOEs, state banks 
» 
or local governments, and therefore, any losses would generally be born by the 
‘ state rather than by the management. Due to the lack of control and 
monitoring, many ITICs operate with complete autonomy. Though these TICs 
, S O E s and local governments are meant to be 'separated' entities, they are 
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just like working inside a closed sphere, no one knows what is happening 
inside, nor any insider will challenge a management 's decision, especially 
those concerning investment. For example, when business became 
unprofitable, GITC borrowed to cover the losses. 
4. Human Capital - Though this sounds discriminating，no one can deny that 
human quality is always the most important issue in management. A good 
system can minimize the probability of fraud case, only if there are good 
managers to implement it. Under the same notion, if the managers in China 
could not grasp the sense of risk management and an effective and fair way to 
do business, they will not be able to create a good system. The theory is 
simple, but the development of human capital is not one day's work. Quicker 
the economy growth, more this issue would come to surface. The question 
remains as “Is this about education or business?.. 
5. TlCs — A Transitional Product under the Economic Reform - If there are so 
many problems about TIC"s management and its position in the complicated 
political-business system in today's China, can it be replaced? As vve can see. 
TICs" major function throughout the economic reforms is to promote and 
facilitate fund flow, which is \ er\' similar to the function o f a capital market in 
an open economy market. Moreover, their diversified business implies that it 
is actually a hybrid of a mix of financial institution. The emergence o f T I C s is 
partly historical due to the restriction of central credit policy. With better 
management system and more complete financial development, there could be 
‘ other institutions that resemble the various functions of TICs, like commercial 
banks, development banks, fund institutions, insurance companies and 
securities houses. Once the development of these individual institutions 
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become more formalized and well-planned, the complicated TICs would 
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Limitations 
After the investigation, we found that here are some limitations in the study 
that hinder us from collecting some information which may be useful for us to make 
more insightful recommendations. 
1. Lack of Transparency. Throughout the study, details of the finapcial 
performance, leverage and compliance by TICs are difficult to come by. 
While a huge amount of mysterious loans has been disclosed, there are very 
limited ways to find out the data in explaining the mysterious loss due to the 
lack of transparency and a well-established compliance system. Since the 
process of liquidation and solvency is still on the way. lots of information is 
being kept as strictly confidential. Besides. TICs' entangled relationship with 
PBOC still remains as a concern of state's level, which makes public access 
difficult. 
2. Uncertainty over Future s Development: Although it has already been months 
after the collapse of GITIC, investors and creditors are still uncertain about 
China's decision over the repayment of loans and any other possible 
‘ restructuring of GITIC. In fact, many other TICs, such as GZTIC, are prone to 
collapse. Further information on regulatory changes and actions by investors 
and China can only be collected when the series events of TICs' failure have 
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been settled in the future. 
3. Focus on Qualitative Approach: This study is primarily based on qualitative 
analysis. Through the examination of China's financial system and TICs' 
development, implications have been drawn largely from a macro-economic 
and regulatory perspective. Thus, in our study, it should be reminded of the 
fact that quantitative analysis comes as secondary to our approach. 
Recommendations 
1. Clear and Fair Bankruptcy Arrangement - No matter how the problems of 
TICs would be handled, the wave of TICs' failure would certainly have great 
impact on the development of China's financial system in the near future. The 
» 
incident of GITIC has not only manifested the keys to setting up an efficient 
supervisory system and handling the bankruptcy ofTICs . Its implication is for 
long term. In fact, foreign investors are already disappointed over the fact of 
losing priorities in the repayment of debt. If the arrangement of bankruptcy of 
GITIC is not to be made fair and clear, investors would probably lose all their 
confidence in China's financial system, and. subsequently, change their 
investment plan. 
2. Clean up of Prohlemalic TICs - In view of the current situation, the incident 
also provides a good timing for authorities to clean up all problematic TICs 
soon after the settlement of GITIC,s bankruptcy. The actions should not be 
superficial but concrete; closing down more TICs or setting up more weak 
regulations would work little. Instead, the government must make an in-depth 
<r 
investigation into the most inner issues. To correct the conditions in a more 
efficient way, identifying and separating the problems is the first step towards 
finding solutions for them. We suggest them to make use of resources in Hong 
4 8 
Kong, such as professionals from Hong Kong Monetary Authority, the 
Finance Department, and Hong Kong Association of Certified Accountants. 
To achieve a better result, independent audit teams should be set up to monitor 
the progress of the whole issue. 
3. Supervision 一 First, it would be desirable to set up and clarify some standards, 
including (i) the accounting rules for TICs' investment, (ii) reporting format of 
financial data, (iii) definition of financial ratios and (iv) compliance provisions 
applicable to all financial institutions, especially TICs. The standard of 
accounting and compliance should deserve more attention if the multi-
business nature of the financial institutions is to be preserved. Second, In 
order to make on-site supervision easier, (i) a detailed manual for supervision 
of different financial institutions, and (ii) extensive training in supervisory 
practices are suggested. Third, in addition to asset-liquidity ratios, we suggest 
that supplementary financial information such as details of calculation would 
be necessary for supervisors to gain a full picture of the health of the TICs. 
4. Legal framcM'ork — There is also an urgent need to reexamine and supplement 
the legal and regulatory framework within which the TICs operate. New laws 
should not only be concerned over the companies" business activities but also 
the personnel management. Moreover, currently, there are too many 
regulations and laws applied to TICs that make the standard ambiguous and 
inconsistent. Thus, consolidation of the current re2ulati0ns is a must. 
‘ w 
Authorities should address the inconsistencies of regulations and remove the 
‘ requirements that are contradicting or useless. This would obviously benefit 
the enforcement of compliance by TICs. 
5. Education - It is probably the most crucial but also most difficult issue. As 
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mentioned, every good system requires good personnel for its implementation 
in order to make the best use of the system. Education can strengthen the 
concept of compliance; education can teach people the importance of 
segregation of duties in a supervisory system; education can limit the 
possibility of fraud case and corruption. Only in a clean and clear 
environment can business grow prosperously and healthily. 
Conclusion 
Some people think that the incident of GITIC or the Asian crisis is good 
because it woke us up from the fantasy of a bubble economy. Without this lesson, 
people would probably have not been able to uncover the hidden problems, and we 
would probably not progress to the next stage of prosperity. Conversely, some think 
that this lesson is apparently too severe that China might not be able to recover from 
the wound again. In fact, it is too early to make any conclusion while China is still 
working hard to recover from this failure during the course of its financial reform. In 





Table 1.1 - The Structure ofChinese Financial Svstem (bv 1995) 
Name ofInstitutions Year of Ownership 
Establishment 
1 Central Bank 
— P e o p l e ’ s B a n k “ 1984 State 
2 Specialized State Banks ~~ 
—Agricu l tu ra l Bank 一 1979 State 
一 Bank of China 1979 State 
一 Construction Bank 1979 S t ^ 
—Indus t r i a l and Commercial Bank 1984 State ‘ 
3 Other Nationwide Banks 
一 China Investment Bank 1981 State 
— B a n k of Communications 1986 Jo in t -Stock~ 
~ ~ CITIC Industrial Bank 1987 ~ ~ S t ^ 
— E v e r b r i g h t Bank 1992 S t ^ 
一 Hua Xia Bank — 1992 S t ^ 
一 Min Sheng Bank “ 1995 S t ^ 
4 Policy Banks 
, 一 Agricultural Development Bank 1994 State 
一 Development Bank 1994 State 
— E x - I m Bank 1994 SlSe 
5 Regional Commcrcial Banks — 
一 China Merchants Bank _ 1987 ~Jo in t - s tock~~ 
一 Shenzhen Development bank 1987 Jo in t - s tock~ 
一 Fujian Industrial Bank 1988 § I S i 
— G u a n g d o n g Development Bank — 1988 Jo in t - s tock~ 
一 Shanghai Piidong Development bank 1988 Jo in t - s tock~ 
一 Bengbu Housing Savings bank — ‘ 1992 ~ J o i n t - s t o c k ~ 
— Y a n t a i Housing Savings bank “ 1992 Jo in t - s tock~ 
‘Hainan Development Bank “ 1995 Joint-stock 
6 Urban Cooperative Banks 
一 Beijing Urban Cooperative Bank “ 1995 Joint-stock~~ 
— S h a n g h a i Urban Cooperative Bank 1995 Jo in t - s tock~ 
|Shenzhen Urban Cooperative Bank 1995 Jo in t - s tock~ 
51 
7 Non-bank Financial Institutions ~ 
— 5 0 , 8 0 0 Rural Credit Cooperatives 1980s Jo in t - s tock~ 
5,200 Urban Credit Cooperatives 1980s Jo in t - s tock~ 
一"394 TICs 1980s "15mt - s tock 
65 Finance Companies 1980s Various 
9 Insurance Companies 1980s Various 
— 1 6 Leasing Companies 1980s Various 
97 Securities Companies 1980s Various 
— M u t u a l Funds 1980s Various 




Table 1.2 - Chronology ofEconomic Reform 
1978 ~Cen t ra l Committee adopts principles of reform 
1979 Responsibility system and price liberalization for agriculture 
1980 ~~Delegation of decision making to provincial and local government. 
Creation ofspecial economic zones 
1981 ~ U r b a n individual enterprises encouraged. ‘ “ 
1982 Price liberalization of consumer goods begins 
1983 ~ P e o p l e ' s bank of China created as central Bank. ~ 
Budgetary allocations to enterprises replaced by loans. 
1984 ~Responsibil i ty system extended to state owned enterprises. ‘ 
Fourteen coastal cities given additional freedom. 
1988 ~~Contract responsibility begins for SOEs. “ 
Regulations on private enterprises published 
Enterprise Law and Bankruptcy Law passed. 
1989 “Regula t ions on mergers,joint-stock companies. 
Regulations on commercialization of banks 
1991 Encouragement of corporatization of enterprises. 
1992 ~~Deng Xiaoping's tour of south, leading to speeding up of reform 
Phasing out of production targets and price controls. . 
1993 Adoption of principle of"socialist market economy' 




Table 1.3 - Chronology ofFinancial Sector Reform 
1980 Enterprises allowed to issue bonds 
1981 State Council approves issue of government bonds 
1984 " T i r s t public issue of shares by Shanghai Feilo Acoustics Company 
1985 ~Government issues securities trading regulations ‘ 
State enterprises begin to issue shares without permission 
State enterprises begin to issue bonds as alternative to credit squeezed banks 
1986 Shengyang branch of PBOC approves first bond tradina counter with local 
ITC � 
Creation of secondary over the counter market in Shanghai ICBC Shanghai 
branch desk 
1987 ~~Bond trading extended to 41 cities ~ 
PBOC circular allow state enterprises to issue bonds but not shares 
1988 State Council approves secondary market for government bonds in 61 cities 
Shenzhen companies issue shares to the public 
1989 ~Secondary bond market extended to further 54 cities ‘ 
1990 Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges start “ 
1991 ~~PBOC starts using securities companies as underwriters 
^ 9 ^ Rules for “B” shares issued by PBOC in Shanghai and Shenzhen . 一 
1992 ""China Securities Regulatory Commission established 
1993 Shanghai and Shenzhen grant seats to foreign securities firms — 
US SEC approves "B"shares for 17-f 
CSRC announces 22 candidates for H shares for 1994 
First national securities regulations 
Memorandum of Regulatory Cooperation between HK and PRC 
State Council issues new national measures for securities exchanges 
1994 Company Law comes into force, replacing old Standard Opinion for new 
companies 
State Council issues regulations on overseas listings 
. Foreign Exchange reform 
1995 Shanghai International Securities scandal - Treasury bond futures trading 
suspended 
New overseas shares issue will be allowed, announced CSRC. No specific 
quotas or dates 
Central Bank Law passed 
Commercial Banking Law passed 
Securities Law in draft 
1996 ~Trus t Law enacted ‘ “ ~~ 
Source: based on World Bank Discussion Paper 
r 
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Table 1.4 - Permitted Business Activities and Managerial Requirements for TICs 
1. TICs Engaged in RMB Business “ 
• Scope ofBusiness 
The following activities are within the scope of business for TICs: 
(a) Trust investment and trust loans to projects designated by consignors 
(category A). . 
(b) Ordinary trust investment and trust loans (category B). 
(c) Financial leasing. 
(d) Property storage and the issuing of securities on behalf of third parties. 
(e) RMB debts guarantee and testimony. 
(f) Economic consultation. 
(g) Security issue authorized by PBOC. 
(h) Other business authorized by PBOC. 
~^~~Management of deposits “ 
TICs can absorb the following trust deposits with duration equal to or greater 
than one year: 
(a) Trust funds for trust investment or trust loans entrusted by the treasury. 
(b) Trust funds for trust investment or trust loans entrusted by the enterprises.. 
(c) Funds entrusted by labour insurance institutions. 
(d) Funds entrusted by scientific research institutes. 
• Management of loans 
TICs must follow these guidelines with respect to loans: 
(a) The proportion of category B deposits used for fixed assets loans and lease 
must be decided by PBOC. 
(b) TICs can extend circulation loans to their clientele. Circulating loans 
extended to other enterprises cannot be longer than 3 months. 
2.TICs Engaged in Foreign Exchange Business 
• Scope ofBusiness 
The foUowing actixities are permissible for TlCs engaged in foreign exchange 
business: 
(a) Onshore and offshore foreign exchange trust deposits. 
(b) Offshore foreign exchange loans. 
(c) Issuing foreign exchange securities on behalf of third parties. 
(d) Foreign exchange trust investment. 
(e) Foreign exchange loans to their clientele. 
( 0 International financing leasing. 
(g) Providing guarantee and testimony to foreigners for loans and contract bid and 
performance. ‘ 
^ (h) Credit investigation and consultation to promote international economic and 
‘ trade cooperation. 
(i) Other business authorized by SAEC, the State Administration of Exchange 
Control. 
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~^~Management of deposits and loans ~~ 
The following guidelines apply to deposits and loans: 
(a) The necessary RMB capital can be obtained by attracting one-year (or longer) 
trust deposits and issuing RMB securities with the authorization o fPBOC. 
(b) TICs engaged in foreign exchange business cannot deal with RMB loans, 
leases or investment unless they have the necessary RMB capital. 
3. Management of the Operations o fAl l TICs 
~^~Planning Management 一 “ 一 
(a) The sources and application of RMB funds must be examined and approved 
by PBOC, while the sources and application of foreign exchange funds must 
be examined and approved by SAEC for their investment plan or fixed assets. 
(b) The fixed assets loans, other investments and leases must be within the 
national investment plan for fixed assets. 
• Management ofReserves 
(a) TICs must open accounts with local branches of PBOC and deposit therein a 
prescribed proportion of its category B deposits. TICs engaged for foreign 
exchange business must open accounts with local branches of Bank of China, 
where they must deposit foreign exchange reserve. 
(b) TICs must maintain reserves for bad debts. 
• Management of Interest Rates 
The RMB and foreign exchange deposit and loan interest rates are determined by 
PBOC 
• Financial Management “ 
TICs must submit the foUowing clociimenls to PBOC: 
(a) Annual working plan 
.. (b) Summary quarterly and monthly performance report of source and application 
of capital 
(c) Annual final statements 
(d) Other important business reports 
//7 addition, TICs engaged in foreign exchange business must submit the cihore-
mentioned documents to the SAEC. 
(Soiirce from The Chinese Financial System, Gveemvood Press) 
•r 
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Table 1.5 - Prudential Ratios for TICs in China (1994) 
Ratios I Requirement 
Capital Adequacy 
1 Capital (Core + Supplement) / Adjusted assets ~ ~ > 8% 
Entrusted Deposit and Loan Ratios 
2 (Entrusted loans + Entrusted investments) / Entrusted deposit ~ \ 
3 (Entrusted loans + Entrusted investments) / Capital ^ ^ 
SelfManaged Loan and Deposit Ratio 
4 (Trust loans + Mortgage loans + Bills discounted + Other loans + <"75% 
Financial leases) / (Trust deposits + Guarantee deposits + Other 
deposits + Bond issued) 
Investment Ratios 
5 (Long Term Investments - Gov. Bonds - Policy Bank Bonds) / < 20% 
Capital 
6 (Short Term Investments - Gov. Bonds - Policy Bank Bonds) / < 30% 
Capital 
Reserve Ratio 
7 (Deposit at PBOC + Interbank Placements + Cash) > ^ % 
/ (Trust Deposits + Guaranteed Deposits + Other Deposits) . 
Liquidity Ratio for Self-managed Loans 
8 (Trust Loans + Mortgage Loans + Other Loans) > 1 year < 3 0 % 
/ Total of(Trust Loans + Mortgage Loans + Other Loans) 
Asset Placement Ratio (Interbank Funds Ratio) 
9 Placements at Banks and FIs / Core Capital | > 1 
Past Due And Distressed Loan Ratios 
10 Past Due Loans / Total Loans “ < ^ 5 % 
11 Stale Loans / Total Loan^ ~ <~5% 
Asset Risk Diversification Ratio 
12 Total Exposure to a Single Legal Person and its Holding Company < 30% 
•  / Capital 
Restriction on External Guarantees 
I 13 Guarantee issued / Capital < ]Q% 
Source: based on World Bank Discussion Paper 
•r 
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Table 1.6 - A Summary of GITIC,s Business bv 1997 
Joint Ventures “ ‘ 
~*~Runs more than 30 McDonald's restaurants in Guangdong 
• Cooperates with PPG Industries in a Shenzhen factory 
Construction Materials Trading “ 
• Conducts wholesale, retail and project-based contracting of marble and granite 
Property Investment ~ 
• GITIC Plaza in Guangzhou and its shopping mall 
• GITIC Center in Hong Kong 
Finance “ “ 
• Issues bonds in Tokyo, London, New York and Hong Kong 
• Funding for infrastructure construction like power plants, highways and bridges 
• Leads in trading volume on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
• Helps SOEs privatize 
Real Estate / Construction “ “ 
• Runs Cement, aluminum and glass plants 
• Operates 20 hotels throughout China 
• Has Overseas investments in Hong Kong, US, Thailand and Macao 
Leasing 
• Leasing of advanced technology and equipment 
• Owns 150 production lines worth US$ 360 million 
t 
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Figure 1.1 - Composition ofDeposits by TICs (1986-1996) 
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Figure 1.2 - The Supervision ofTICs bv PBOC 
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